Abstract: Armchair strategists analyzing the far-reaching impli- cations of Soviet intervention in Afghanistan tend to ignore or under- emphasize one very important reality: The Soviet occupation of Af- ghanistan is not yet an established fact. The Afghan resistance movement has become a national liberation war, posing a real and formidable challenge to Soviet control over Afghanistan. Six months after the Soviet intervention in December 1979, Brezhnev claimed in the plenary session of the central committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union: "Now life in Afghanistan is gradually returning to normal. Large bands of counterrevolutionaries have been routed, and interventionists have suf- fered a serious defeat."' But four years later, the Soviet media continue to report "counterrevolutionary" activities, admitting that "many public institutions in Afghanistan have been destroyed. Industrial enterprises, utility lines and irrigation systems have become targets of sabotage, costing Afghan industry alone 2.8 billion Afghanis.3 On April 11, 1983, Kabul Radio carried a broadcast in which Prime Minister Sultan Ali Keshtmand revealed that half of Afghanistan's hospitals and schools have been destroyed and three-quarters of the country's communications have been disrupted by the guerrillas.4

Abstract:

This article explores the motives of Ghana’s Trades Union Congress in
securing development assistance during the era of decolonization and early independence. African interests and agency in these complex processes of negotiation have not been sufficiently untangled to highlight the decisions that African trade unionists made as they aligned with, and fostered, international networks and alliances to meet particular development goals. By highlighting the perspectives and actions of Ghana’s trade union officials, the article demonstrates what Africans sought to achieve through connections to international trade union organizations. The Ghana case illustrates the ways in which African trade unionists actively engaged in the variable and competing politics and policies of local, regional, and global trade unionism in order to strengthen their union apparatus and meet shifting needs.

Abstract: South Sudan’s latest peace deal has been lauded as a milestone in the country’s long road to peace and stability. The Revitalised Agreement for the Resolution of Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS) outlines power-sharing arrangements between rivals President Salva Kiir and main rebel/opposition leader Riek Machar, and provides a blueprint for a sustainable peace and democratic transition. Despite this welcome development, South Sudan’s revitalised peace process has been marred by delays, uncertainty, divisions and the regionalisation of the conflict. As a result, key issues relating to state boundaries and security arrangements remain unresolved, leaving the primary drivers of the conflict untouched. The civil war in South Sudan – which broke out in 2013 – has cost an estimated 400 000 lives, displaced millions and plunged the nascent country into a state of deprivation. South Sudan and its people must urgently facilitate a return to peace, stability, reconciliation and unity. This paper contextualises the agreement, examines its contents and presents the key enablers of and barriers to the success of the revitalised peace process.

Abstract:

The British surprisingly faced no military resistance when they captured Asante in 1896. Previous works have focused on the agency of actors like Prempe and Frederick Hodgson to explain why. This paper, in contrast, approaches this epoch in Asante history from the context of the sociopolitical power structure within which the precolonial Asante state operated. It asserts that Asante's independence was contingent on having a strong military. But since it had no standing army, the state used Asante's ‘social contract’ to coerce its subjects into ad hoc armies to meet military threats. Starting from the 1874 Sagrenti War, however, the state disregarded the social contract. This unleashed a series of events that undermined the state's power to coerce Asantes into military service. The article posits further that this erosion of the state's coercive power ultimately prevented it from countering the British with armed resistance in 1896 to maintain independence.

Abstract:

Drawing upon a book by J.M. Lecomte on the genocide of the Jews by the Nazi Germans, the author examines the seven stages in the genocide of the Tutsi in Rwanda. These stages, which do not necessarily follow one another in time but may overlap, can be classified in the following way: (i) definition of the target group on the basis of some criteria; (ii) registration of the victims; (iii) designation or outward identification of the victims; (iv) restriction and confiscation of goods; (v) exclusion from professions, working activities and means of transportation, among other things; (vi) systematic isolation; (vii) mass extermination.

Abstract:

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